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Trends in Financing of Capital Formation:
Share of Internal Funds
Problems of Analysis
IN modern economies, additions to and replacements of capital goods
are, to an overwhelming extent, purchased by the would-be capital
user. They are not the product of his own work. We must, therefore,
consider the question of financing: where does the capital acquiring
unit obtain the means for purchases? Here the important distinction
between internal financing (by the user's own funds) and external (by
somebody else's funds) arises. It is important because in internal fi-
nancing only the capital user's decision matters, but in external
financing others share in making the decision. Within external financ.
ing there are also significant distinctions: between equity funds, which
carry no fixed obligation of interest and repayment, and debt moneys;
and within debt, among loans of differing duration and conditions as
to security. There are, finally, important differences in external financ-
ing between funds that flow directly from the owner-lender to the
borrower-user, and those that are channeled through financial inter-
mediaries.
In discussing the magnitudes of capital formation in the two pre.
ceding chapters, we dealt with part of the final product of economic
activity and compared it directly with the over-all product represented
by the relevant countrywide totals. In discussing financing, we deal
with an aspect of the mechanism by which capital formation is brought
about, not with the eventual result. This shift in the orientation of
discussion raises several problems that must be clarified before we can
deal meaningfully with the relevant statistical estimates.
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The question of financing is realistic only when viewed from the
standpoint of a single economic unit intending to acquire capital goods
for replacement or additions. Only when we ask where it secures the
means for such acquisition can we see clearly the distinction between ex-
ternal and internal funds. When we deal with the economy as a whole,
external means are limited to foreign funds; and in a closed economy,
there can be no external funds. Indeed, by definition, countrywide capi-
tal formation is financed by savings, and the two totals are identical;
hence any distinction between investment and financing can begin only
at the level of a subsector of the total economy. To put it differently, a
countrywide total of capital formation financing, if it is to have more
meaning than a tautology, should be built up from the records of
each economic unit, with the distinctions among units recorded, rather
than disregarded as they are in estimating total capital formation.
If, then, we view the process from the standpoint of the single eco-
nomic unit—the house purchaser, the firm, the nonprofit or the gov-
ernment institution—the first important observation is that such units
cannot operate with real capital assets alone. They also need financial
assets: cash and near cash, to cover gaps between receipts and pay-
ments; accounts receivable as a means of easing sales; government se-
curities as a way of keeping quick reserves without undue loss of
interest; and so on. On a countrywide basis, these financial claims
cancel all counterclaims except those on the foreign debts and claims
account. But they are indispensable to the economic units within the
country. Thus we find, particularly for business firms (most important
for our purposes), that changes in real assets, representing capital for-
mation, are almost always accompanied by changes in financial assets.
Hence, except in those rare cases in which real assets are the only
ones that rise over the period under study, the financing stream—the
flow of funds on the sources side—must be related, not to capital forma-
tion alone, but to the acquisition of all assets, financial included. A
business firm, especially, is a complex of both real and financial assets,
and we can distinguish the financing of capital formation alone by
assuming exceptional conditions in which it represents the only use
of additional funds or by dint of other unrealistic assumptions.
The difficulty is solved but poorly by assigning certain sources of
funds exclusively to certain uses. It is tempting to argue that deprecia-
tion allowances are assignable to the financing of gross capital forma-
tion alone, but the fact is that in industries with a limited growth
horizon such funds can be, and are, put to other uses; and this may
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be true of all industries in times of depression. It seems plausible that
short-term funds should be used to finance only quick assets; but it is
rationally justifiable and not unusual for a growing industry to use
them in part to finance long-term assets. The examples given refer to
industries in the early and late stages of growth, because the fluidity
among various sources of funds and uses is greatest in those transition
phases. And one can argue that, "normally," long-term funds would
be given priority in financing long-term assets, and short-term funds
priority in financing quick assets. The exceptions are important, how-
ever, and it is necessary to stress in advance that many of the statistical
comparisons to follow imply assumptions of too rigid a connection be-
tween specific sources and specific uses of funds.
There is a somewhat related difficulty. Granted an association be-
tween the character of the source of funds and the type of use, real and
financial assets are interrelated and should be treated as a single com-
plex. The point is important because levels of and trends in shares in
financing of various types of sources are greatly affected. A simple illus-
tration will suffice. Assume that a firm has gross real capital formation
of $2 million, and an addition to its accounts receivable of $1 million—
these being the only changes on the assets side. Assume further that
there is a gross retention of $2 million, $1 million of which is deprecia-
tion allowances and $1 million retained profits, and that accounts pay-
able increased $1 million—these being the only changes on the liabili-
ties side. What was the share of capital formation financed by internal
funds? If, as is often done, we net out accounts receivable and payable—
which implies that this source of funds can finance only this use of
funds—gross retention accounts fully for gross capital formation, and
the share of internal funds in financing is 100 per cent. But if we
say that the total $3 million of additions to assets was financed by $2
million of gross retention and $1 million of additions to accounts pay-
able, the share of internal financing in total acquisition of assets is
66.7 per cent. We cannot say specifically, therefore, how gross capital
formation was financed, except within a range of from $1 million to
$2 million from internal funds, and from zero to $1 million from ex-
ternal funds.
I would be inclined to argue that the netting out of the receivables
and payables in the example just cited (indeed, any netting out of
this type) and the assignment of gross retention to gross capital forma-
tion exclusively represent an unwarranted oversimplification. For the
problem of financing is essentially the problem of how effectively our
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economic institutions function in placing capital in the hands of
would-be capital users. The fact that the firm in the example added
to its accounts payable meant that the credit network had to be
stretched to accommodate the change; and the fact that the firm, at
the same time, advanced an equal amount of credit—while it affected
the firm's net position—does not obviate the need for the services of
the credit system with respect to the payables. Furthermore, additions
to accounts receivable may be viewed as a means of making capital
formation effective from the standpoint of the firm. We should, there-
fore, view the total addition to assets as a bundle of items that cannot
be separated, either by netting out or by assigning gross retention to
gross capital formation alone.
Even if we follow the rule of comparing all additions to assets with
changes in all sources of funds, the result may be oversimplified from
the standpoint of a proper study of the financing process. The above
example is a simple case of the customary sources- and uses-of-funds
analysis, based largely upon net changes in assets (uses) and in liabili-
ties (sources), with some partial use of the income account (for such
items as depreciation charges and net retention). But these are all net
changes, and during the year (if that is the period under consideration)
large inflows and outflows of funds may occur, which call for further
services of financial and credit mechanisms. Thus, there may be no
net change in long-term debt outstanding; but an old bond issue may
have been repaid and a new one floated. Such transactions are not
effortless acts that should be represented by a blank in the accounts.
Many items on the uses and sources sides of funds—notably the
short-term ones—are far more subject to cancellation of gross inflows
and outflows than others. If we argue—not without reason—that it
is the gross flows of funds that are indispensable to the firm's opera-
tion during the year, the picture of internal and external financing
may change sharply again. Thus, if in the above example we assume
that the net addition of $1 million to accounts receivable was the re-
suit of a gross extension of $5 million and repayment of $4 million;
that the same was true of the net addition to accounts payable; and
that no such gross flows could be associated with the movement of
depreciation charges and net retention, then total gross uses of funds
are $7 million, and the share of internal financing in gross uses of
funds drops to 29 per cent. This percentage is an accurate reflection
of the share of internal funds in the total financial operations during
the year by the firm in question. The example could be pushed further
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to show also the effects on the calculation of the shares of internal
and external financing.
If the argument above is valid, capital formation becomes a rela-
tively small fraction of gross additions to total assets by the firm dur-
ing the year, and the sources of its financing seem to become increas-
ingly less identifiable. Yet it would be unrealistic to press the argument
beyond its proper limit. It is useful only in indicating that capital
formation financing is a small part of the total gross flow of funds
financing economic activity. But if we treat financing in grosser terms,
the distinction between long-term and short-term becomes stronger, and
the rationale for assigning differing term funds to their corresponding
term assets becomes more compelling. Net changes in short-term funds
can be applied to long-term uses, up to a point; but this is not true
of gross flows, which can be kept at their large volume only by frequent
repayments. Conversely, long-term funds can be used for short-term
assets and for their continuous circulation, but they are more appro-
priately employed when tied up in long-term assets; and if there
is any need for the latter, long-term funds would have priority. In
short, at the level of the single firm, we can get meaningful results
by studying the financing of capital formation jointly with net changes
in financial assets, setting against them the internal and external
sources. If net changes in financial assets are not too large compared
with additions to real assets, it may even be possible to discern move-
ments in the financing of capital formation alone.
We rarely have data, however, for single economic units, and cer-
tainly not for enough of them to permit us to derive aggregates. What-
ever data are available are already aggregates of units. This poses a
new difficulty in the analysis of financing.
The difficulty is essentially that opposite movements among the
units in the aggregate cancel each other. Assume that a firm employs
its earned depreciation of $10 million to repay part of an outstanding
bond issue, and has no other changes in assets and liabilities. Assume
that another firm uses the same amount of earned depreciation plus
$10 million derived from a bond issue to purchase $20 million in capi-
tal goods. For the aggregate—consisting of these two firms—total gross
capital formation will be $20 million; the total debt outstanding will
remain the same; and it will appear as if the $20 million in capital for-
mation were financed by the earned depreciation, that is, entirely out
•of internal funds. But in reality, the firm that was responsible for this
capital formation financed half of it from external funds; and the fact
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that the other firm made a net contribution to the capital market by
redeeming $10 million of its bonds does not obviate the need for the
services of the financial institutions. In particular, the fact that the
firm providing the $10 million in bonds had a part in the acquisition
of the $20 million in capital goods is concealed in the aggregated totals.
This difficulty is clearly additional to those illustrated by the case
of a single economic unit. The essential point here is that what is
internal to an industry may be external to some firms in it; and what
is internal to an economy may be external to some industrial sectors in
it. The whole concept of internality and externality is dependent, in
an aggregated total, upon the size of the group involved in the aggrega-
tion. In general, the larger the number of units in the aggregate, the
greater the likelihood of cancellation of the kind illustrated, and hence
the greater the amount of external financing concealed. It follows that
the practice of aggregating to a net total tends to exaggerate the share
of internal financing and to understate the share of external financing,
if the distinction between the two is, as it should be, in terms of the
unit responsible for the decision—the firm, the individual, or the non-
profit institution. It also tends to conceal any redistribution of liabilities
and assets among the units in the aggregate, and hence the gross
amount of external funds involved.
This bias and concealment could be obviated if, in the aggregation,
units that had positive additions to a given type of asset could be sep-
arated from those that sustained net decreases in that asset. It could
then be seen that the total additions were financed by corresponding
changes on the sources-of-funds side (or by reduction of other assets);
and that the total decreases were associated with corresponding reduc-
tions on the liabilities side (or with increases in other assets). But such
totaling could be carried through systematically only for each type of
asset separately (or for some specific combination of types), and would
differ as the type of asset differed.
We could achieve the desired results if we divided all units into two
groups—those whose gross capital formation was at least as large as
their gross retention, and those whose gross capital formation fell short
of the latter. Proceeding similarly for changes in financial assets, we
could then observe the sources of financing separately for each group.
But no such summations are available; and we are forced to operate
with net aggregates of the type in our example.
The embarrassing consequence of this limitation is that it prevents
us from observing trends in the proportion of concealment of external
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financing, which may run against or reinforce other trends suggested
by a sources-and-uses analysis of funds based on industry or larger
aggregates. To illustrate: assume that the ratio of gross retention to
gross capital formation for an industry is rising, suggesting a rise in
the share of internal funds in financing capital formation. Assume
further that, in line with earlier discussion, gross retention is related
not to gross capital formation alone but to total uses—the sum of
gross capital formation and net changes in financial assets—and the
share of internal funds still rises. Yet over the period, disparities in
behavior, of the type suggested in the illustration, among individual
firms within the industry may have increased. Whereas in earlier days
all firms added to their capital stock and drew fully upon their retained
funds for the purpose, in recent times some firms have continued to
follow that course and have even expanded their capital assets through
borrowing, but others have failed to expand and in a sense have shifted
their resources out of the industry. If such a trend occurred, the ex-
ternal financing concealed in the aggregates would have increased
proportionately, possibly to the point of offsetting the trend toward
the decline in the share of external financing suggested above. Con-
versely, the trend in disparities among firms may have been in the
opposite direction, reinforcing the trend toward the decline observed
in the share of external financing in total asset acquisition.
Further problems in the analysis are bound to emerge as we attempt
to deal with the estimates, but they can best be noted as they appear.
For the present, the following conclusions may be stated, as qualifica-
tions upon any findings suggested by the statistical aggregates.
1. Financing of capital formation, as distinct from financing of all
asset acquisition, can be measured only if we assign certain sources of
funds to capital formation as a first priority. Such an assignment may
be unrealistic.
2. It follows that financing of all asset acquisition must be studied,
at least as a check; and if net changes in financial assets loom large
compared with capital formation, statements concerning financing of
the latter can be made only within wide limits.
3. Financing assumes full meaning only for a single economic unit
because the distinction between external and internal funds and
changes in various types of external obligations can be clearly stated
only for a unit. In aggregating, on a net basis, the data for groups,
the considerable cancellation that usually occurs conceals external
financing and exaggerates internal (external and internal from the
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standpoint of the unit). It naturally fails to reveal gross demands upon
borrowing of various types.
Distribution between internal and External Financing:
the Industrial Sectors
We begin examination of the statistical evidence with the data that
bear upon the long-term trends in the shares of internal and external
financing. As already indicated, we cannot work with countrywide
totals but must use data for groups of capital users, the number of
groups being determined largely by the available material. We discuss
first the financing of nonfarm residential construction, on which our
data are most direct; then proceed to the financing of capital formation
in agriculture and, insofar as data permit, in nonfarm unincorporated
business; go on to the financing of capital formation by business cor-
porations, distinguishing as many major industrial sectors as possible;
and conclude with the rather distinctive pattern of financing by gov-
ernments.
NONFARM RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION
Thanks to the work by Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, the sources of
funds can be linked directly with a given complex of real capital forma-
tion—in this case, nonfarm residential construction (excluding non-
housekeeping units, which, however, are not a sizable proportion of
the total).1 The procedure involves direct, though approximate, data
on the share of new construction (including cost of land) accounted
for by transactions paid fully in cash; and then, within total housing
expenditures financed by credit (largely mortgages), the share of pur-
chase (or construction) costs accounted for by mortgage advances is
distinguished (Table 34).
It should be noted at the start that cash purchases, which are de-
scribed as internal financing, and whose share in total expenditures
on nonfarm residential construction is shown in column 7, may ex-
aggerate the true levels. If a person purchases a new house (or pays
for its construction) with cash borrowed from a bank, external rather
than internal financing is involved. It is fair to argue, however, that
cash payments for residential construction can hardly be drawn to any
significant extent from short-term credit sources; and if they repre-
1SeeLeo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in
Residential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects (Princeton for NBER, 1956).
227Trends in Financing of Capital Formation
TABLE 34
SHARES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING AND INTERNAL FINANCING, NEW NONFARM RESIDENTIAL
CONSTRUCTION, 1911—1955
(amounts in billions of dollars)
Total External Internal
ExpendituresExpenditures Amount of Financing Financing
for NonfarmFinanced by (2) as Mortgages (4) asas Per Centas Per Cent















1.1911—1920 13.41 9.60 71.6 6.50 67.7 48.3 51.5
2.1921—1930 45.52 37.47 82.3 28.76 76.8 63.2 36.8
3.1931—1940 14.23 12.10 85.0 8.68 71.7 60.9 39.1
4.1941—1945 7.36 6.75 91.7 5.46 80.9 74.2 25.8
5.1946—1955 105.49 93.32 88.5 76.96 82.5 73.0 27.0
Including land.
SOURCE: Calculated from Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in
Residenliat Real Estate: Trends and Prospects (Princeton for NBER, 1956), Table M-1, pp. 454—455,
and Table 80. p. 320.
sent personal borrowing by the would-be capital user from relatives or
friends, the sources of funds are still internal to the wider group of
individuals joined by ties of blood or friendship. Yet, as measures
of the share of internal financing, the entries in column 7 are over-
estimates.
The distinction here between internal and external is, as it should
be, with reference to a single unit—whether an individual or a corpo-
ration—that purchases or constructs new residential housing. This
means that much of the external financing, i.e., a large share of the
funds advanced, chiefly as mortgage money, is contributed by owners
of residential housing paying back advances made in the past. Thus,
even in the prosperous 1920's and the second half of the 1940's, re-
payments of mortgages accounted for between one-half and three-
quarters of the mortgage loans made during a given year.2 In poor
years, repayments are likely to exceed new mortgage advances. Hence,
if we viewed all owners of residential housing as constituting a single
industry (including the new entrants or new purchasers) and offset new
mortgages (or other credit advances) by repayments, the share of ex-
ternal financing would be far smaller than that shown in column 6 of
Table 34. But the share as shown is far more relevant for our purpose.
2 Ibid., Table 49, p.179.
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Over the period covered by Table 34, the share of external sources
in the financing of new nonfarm residential construction has risen
markedly, and that of internal financing declined correspondingly.
Even though the periods distinguished are, for the most part, discrete
decades—no attempt having been made to cancel out the effects of
long swings—the upward movement of the share of external financing
is pronounced, consistent, and unmistakable.
The distribution within the table indicates that the upward trend
is a composite of two subtrends. First, the proportion of new con-
struction that involves external financing (i.e., that is not fully a cash
transaction) has been rising (column 3). Second, the share of mort-
gages and contract sales in total expenditures financed by borrowing
has also been rising (column 5). Indeed, the very high levels reached
by the percentages in columns 3 and 5 suggest that they are not far
from a limit. If we assume that, at most, 95 per cent of residential con-
struction requires some financing (after all, some purchases will be
made with cash), and that the ratio of the value of mortgages to the
total expenditures financed by borrowing cannot appreciably exceed
80 per cent, then the upper limit of the share of external financing
is 76 per cent—not much higher than the share prevailing since 1941.
While Table 34 covers only the period since 1911, there is evidence
to suggest that the upward trend in the share of external financing is
of longer duration—indeed, can be traced back to 1890. According to
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, the proportion of net change in mortgage
debt to total nonfarm residential construction in 1910—1919 was about
38 per cent (compared with the 48.5 per cent share of external financing
of total expenditures in 1911—1920, line 1 of Table 34), and the cor-
responding per cent was 15.5 in 1900—1909, and only 8.4 in 1890—1899.
Even if the rise in the ratio of new mortgage financing to new con-
struction was not as rapid as that in the ratio of net changes in debt to
new construction, it also must have risen appreciably between 1890—
1900 and 1910—1920. Moreover, the proportion of mortgaged homes
among owner occupied dwellings has increased (since 1890) and there
is a tendency for the debt-to-value ratio of these mortgaged homes to
rise. It seems clear that the upward movement in the share of ex-
ternal financing in nonfarm residential capital formation is a trend
that goes back at least to 1890.
3Ibid.,Table 45, p. 171.
4Ibid.,Table 44, p. 170.
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During the same period, the ratio of depreciation or capital con-
sumption allowances to gross capital formation represented by nonfarm
residential construction was rising. This ratio, for volumes in current
prices, rose from 37 per cent in 1889—1909 to 64 per cent in l94l—1950.
While the extension to 1955 lowers the ratio of depreciation charges
to 44 per cent,° it is still higher than in 1889—1909; and through much
of the period, when the share of internal financing was declining, the
ratio of depreciation charges to gross value of new housing was rising.
If we could assume that depreciation charges were "earned" by real
estate owners, and that they were a source of financing internal to
the whole group of owners, including the new, the share of internal
sources would show an upward rather than a downward trend. But
this is precisely what we cannot assume: the units that were earning
and accumulating depreciation funds were least likely to be the units
that were purchasing new construction.
Before we speculate about the reasons for the upward trend in the
share of external sources in financing new nonfarm residential hous-
ing, three other relevant trends should be briefly noted. First, within
this category there has been a steady rise in the share of owner oc-
cupied dwellings, and a decline in that of tenant occupied. The former
rose from about 37 per cent in 1890 and 1900 to about 53 per cent in
1950; and the latter declined accordingly from about 63 per cent to
about 47 per cent.7 This means that owner occupied dwellings repre-
sented an increasing share of the net additions to the number of
dwelling units. Between 1890 and 1910 the total increase in number
of dwelling units reporting tenure was 5.7 million, the rise in owner
occupied being 2.3 million or 40 per cent, and that in tenant occupied,
3.4 million or 60 per cent. The rise from 1910 to 1930 amounted to
9.2 million units, of which the rise in owner occupied was 5.3 million
or 58 per cent and that of tenant occupied, 3.9 million or 42 per cent.
From 1930 to 1950, the net addition to dwelling units was 14.2 million,
of which the rise in owner occupied was 9.3 million or 65 per cent and
the rise in tenant occupied, 4.9 million or 35 per cent. Thus the rise
in the share of external financing was paralleled by an upward trend
in the share of new dwellings that were owner occupied.
5Ibid.,Table 16, p. 66.
6Ibid.,Table 78, p. 313.
7By1956 the share of owner occupied dwellings had risen to 59 per cent—see Con-
.cuiner Instalment Credit (Board of Governors. Federal Reserve System, 1957), Part I,
Vol. 1, Table 1, p. 10. See also Historical Statisticsof the UnitedStates, 1789—1945,
and Continuation, Series H-l02 and H-104.
230Share of Internal Funds
Second, during the last two to two and a half decades, the proportion
of one-family dwellings in the total increased markedly.8 The record
extends back only to 1900. During the first three decades, one-family
dwellings accounted for only about two-thirds of the total number of
nonfarm housekeeping dwelling Units started. Indeed, the proportion
declined somewhat in the 1920's when it accounted for about 62 per
cent, whereas two-family dwellings constituted almost 15 per cent, and
three-family or multifamily units, almost 2S per cent. But in the
period 1946—1955, one-family dwelling units accounted for 87 per
cent of all dwellings, with two-family units constituting about 4 per
cent, and multifamily units, somewhat over 9 per cent of all dwellings.
The third, and for the present purpose perhaps most important
trend, was the decline in real capital investment per dwelling, rela-
tive to the general rise in per capita income. For the twenty years,
1889—1908, average expenditure per new private nonfarm house-
keeping dwelling unit was $5,679, in 1929 prices, whereas in 1946—
1955 it was only $3,894. Net national product per worker, also in
1929 prices, rose from $1,057 in 1889—1908 to $2,242 in 1946—1955
(see Table 5, column 6, excluding military capital formation). This
means that the ratio of average expenditure per dwelling unit to net
national product per worker declined from 5.4 in 1899—1908 to 1.7
in 1946—1955. While one should not overrate the significance of the
magnitudes just quoted, it is clear that the ratio of capital invest-
ment per dwelling unit to the average income of individuals has de-
clined substantiallybo
With these several trends in view, an explanation of the long-term
rise in the share of external financing of new nonfarm residential con-
S See Grebler, et at., op. cit., Table B-2, pp. 333—334, and Historical Statistics.
0 Grebler, et al., op. cit., Table J-1 and p. 315.
10 Two factors may have made the decline somewhat smaller. One is the possible
decline in the number of workers per family Unit with the reduction in size of
family, and a slightly lower ratio of labor force to total population in 1950 than
in 1910. The other is the fact that national product per worker as shown relates
to total labor force, not to nonfarm alone. The recent increase in the ratio of per-
worker income in agriculture to per-worker income in the nonagricultural sectors
means that product per worker in the nonfarm areas increased at a slightly lower
rate than the countrywide level of product per worker. But both qualifications are
quantitatively minor, and would reduce the decline in the ratio only slightly.
See also the recent discussion of the trend in average expenditure per dwelling
unit in Margaret G. Reid, Capita1 Formation in Residential Real Estate," Journal
of Political Economy, April 1958, pp. 131—153, and the reply, "Once More: Capital
Formation in Residential Real Estate," by Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, in that
journal, December 1959, pp. 612—627.
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struction can be suggested—particularly if we assume that the capital
users are primarily individuals for whom house ownership and use
is not a major occupation. We could, then, say that the rising trend
in the share of external sources in financing new residential housing
was a consequence of the increased willingness of would-be capital
users—largely households—to borrow in order to acquire such assets,
and of the increased willingness of lending agencies to extend credit.
Although the factors involved in the demand for and supply of funds
were somewhat interrelated, it is convenient to note them separately.
The increased willingness of the capital users to borrow was one
manifestation of a broader movement that has emerged since 1900 and
extended also to consumer durable goods.' It was partly an effect of
the rising standard of living, of the increased output of goods per
capita, which permitted consumers to satisfy their desire for superior
goods, including owned houses rather than rented houses. It was partly
an effect of technological changes, which permitted the extension of
urban residential areas (and we deal here with nonfarm housing) away
from the congested centers of cities, and made single-family dwelling
economically more feasible. It was partly a result of the reduction in
real capital invested per dwelling unit, a finding referred to above.
The declining ratio of such capital investment to average income di-
minished the risk to the would-be capital user in acquiring ownership,
even though investment meant the assumption of debt. The increasing
stability of income over time, and the long-term rise in prices, which
automatically brings about a decline in the ratio of fixed debt to the
value of an asset, had similar effects. Finally, the terms of mortgage
financing changed: interest rates were lowered and the average contract
term was lengthened, which made the burden of borrowing easier12
There were also changes on the supply side of funds, which increased
the willingness of lending agencies to finance a rising share of new
gross capital formation in this field. The very factors that reduced the
risk to would-be capital users in assuming debt obligations in their
purchase of new housing made the potential borrowers more credit
worthy. The growth in the volume of mortgage financing meant, under
normal conditions, a greater volume of repayments from which new
housing could be financed. An increasing share of personal savings
was flowing to such intermediate institutions as insurance companies
ii See the discussion in Consumer instalment Credit, Part I, Vol.1, Chap. 2,
pp. 7—21.
12SeeGrebler, et al., op. cit., Chap. XV, pp. 220—237.
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and building and loan associations, which found placement of funds
in mortgages relatively attractive. Last, but not least, the attempt by
the government, since the 1930's, to support residential mortgage
credit has had considerable impact.'
AGRICULTURE
Turning now to trends in financing of capital formation in agriculture,
we shift to capital users who must be treated more as business units
than as households, although there is still an intimate connection be-
tween the farmer's business and his household.
Table 35 is based on the work of Tostlebe, presented in detail in his
monograph, cited previously.14 Data for 1950—1955 were extrapolated
by the movement in the Department of Agriculture estimates. Because
we deal here with a business unit, we are immediately confronted
with some of the problems touched upon in the first section of this
chapter. Should we relate the sources of financing to real capital forma-
tion alone, or to total additions to assets? And specific to farming (and
other unincorporated business) is the question: should we view fi-
nancial reserves (other than cash working balances) as internal to the
business unit, or external?
The period of some fifty-five years covered by Table 35 is fairly long,
as economic periods go. Yet it has been affected by violent changes in
prices and in the market position of agriculture, which distort the
ratios and make the establishment of long-term trends a rather hazard-
ous undertaking. With this advance warning, we present some pre-
liminary conclusions. We deal here with the financing of gross capital
formation: the assignment of any sources of funds to net capital
formation would be so arbitrary that inferences would be worthless.
1. In studying the movement of the ratio of borrowing to gross capi-
tal formation, we omitted the periods that cover the span from 1930
through 1944. In the depressed decade of the 1930's, capital formation
was quite small, and market conditions restricted the supply of external
funds. In the 1940—1944 quinquennium, on the other hand, funds were
available but the supply of real capital goods was restricted. Both
periods are, therefore, distorted either on the supply-of-funds side, or
on the supply-of-assets side.
13 Ibid., Chapter XVI.
14 Alvin S. Tostlebe, Capital in Agriculture: its Formation and Financing since
1870 (Princeton for NBER, 1957).
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TABLE 35
CAPITAL FORMATION FINANCING, AGRICULTURE, 1900—1955





















1. Net real capital formation
2. Capital replacement
3. Gross real capital formation, lines 1
and 2
4. Net increase in cash working balances




































6. Total, lines 3, 4, and 5 9.8 20.1 9.9 10.4 20.7 22.9 32.2
Sources of Funds
7. Capital consumption allowances
8. Net income, line 9 minus line 7






























11. Total (equals line 6) 9.8 20.1 9.9 10.4 20.7 22.9 32.2
Ratios
12. Capital consumption allowances to
GCF, line 2 or 7 to line 3
13. Gross retention to GCF. line 9 to line 3






















15. Gross retention to total uses, line 9 to
line 6 0.72 0.52 0.86 (0.66) 1.19 1.10 0.87 0.80
GCFgross capital formation.
Figures in parentheses in cols. 3 and 4 are adjusted for estimated change in debt by foreclosure—see
Tostlebe, o. Cu.,pp.142—144.
In this and the following tables in Chapters 5 and 6. a dash (—) indicates that the ratio was not
computed because the numerator and/or the denominator was negative, zero, or close to zero.
SouacE, BYCOLUMN
(1)—(6) Tostlebe, op.cii., Tables34—36, pp. 135—138.
(7) The Balance Sheet of Agriculture, 1956, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 163, Nov. 1956.
Line 1.Changes in volumes in constant prices, Table 2, p. 4, multiplied by the price indeE
derived from Tables 1 and 2.
Line 2.Depreciation and consumption of farm capital, Table 3, p. 6. The entry for 1951
is interpolated.
Lines 4—5. Change in financial assets, Table I.
Line 10.Change in total debt, Table 1.
2. We can compare the experience of the three decades from 1900
through 1929 with that of the last eleven years of the period studied,
1945—1955. The share of borrowing, which was three-tenths of gross
capital formation during 1900—1909, rose sharply in 1910—1919, when
the increasing values of land and acquisitions of new farms were ac-
companied by extensive borrowing. The net change in debt in the
1920's should be corrected for the effects of reduction by foreclosure,
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which obviously is not a reduction of debt by a draft upon income.
With this approximate correction (see figures in parentheses in col-
umns 3 and 4), the share of net borrowing in gross capital formation
in the 1920's amounted to about three-tenths. The arithmetic mean
share for the three decades is 42 per cent, compared with less than 20
per cent for the 1945—1955 period. One might say, then, that the share
of borrowing in financing of new capital formation in agriculture de-
clined appreciably.
3. A similar conclusion emerges if we relate borrowing to total
uses of funds, that is, consider net increase in cash working balances
and in financial reserves as part of the operating complex of agricul-
ture. The share of borrowing in that larger total was 28 per cent in
1900—1909, 48 per cent in 1910—1919, and, with the correction for fore-
closures, 34 per cent in 1920—1929, the arithmetic mean for the three
decades being 37 per cent. The corresponding share was 13 per cent
for 1945—1949 and 20 per cent for 1950—1955, an average of about 16
per cent for 1945—1955. Thus over the period the share of borrowing
in total uses of funds declined to less than one-half its share in the
early periods.
4. The conclusions remain unchanged if we exclude the decade of
World War I as atypical. The share of borrowing in the financing of
gross capital formation in 1900—1909 and in 1920—1929 (30 per cent)
is higher than the share in 1945—1955 (below 20 per cent) and the
same trend is evident in the share of borrowing in total uses of funds.
5. It follows that the share of internal financing—gross retention—
in capital formation or in total uses rose over the period. But was this
rise associated with the capital consumption allowances or the net
income component of internal financing? In line 12 we show the ratio
of capital consumption allowances to gross capital formation, based
on current price values. Had this ratio been based on values in
constant prices, we would expect to find a fairly continuous upward
trend. There is some trace of such a trend even in the ratio shown,
but it is not pronounced. True, during 1900—1919, the ratio of capi-
tal consumption allowances to gross capital formation was about 60
per cent, whereas the corresponding ratio for 1945—1955 was over 70
per cent. But when we include the 1920's, the average for the first three
decades is almost 80 per cent.
6. One is more impressed by the role played by changes in the ratio
of net income to gross capital formation in producing the upward
trend in the ratio of internal financing to capital formation. Net in-
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come was about two-tenths of gross capital formation in 1900—1909,
less than one-tenth in 1910—1919, and was negative in 1920—1929. For
1945—1955, the ratio of net income to gross capital formation was over
26 per cent. The rise in the share of internal financing, indicated by
the comparison of 1945—1955 with the period 1900—1929, may be
ascribed, to a considerable extent, to the economic improvement in
the position of agriculture, whereby it could earn sufficient net in-
come, not only to increase its financial assets substantially, but to
finance internally an increasing proportion of additions to its real
assets—its gross capital formation.
In concluding this brief discussion of the findings suggested by Table
35, two major qualifications must be emphasized. First, a long-term
"trend," derived by comparing the experience of eleven years at the
end of a fifty-six year span with that of two or three decades at the
beginning, may be subject to a wide margin of error. The rather wide
changes in financial structure in agriculture from one decade to the
next revealed in Table 35 make it unsafe to infer trends from such a
comparison. Yet the data do not permit us to do much else.
The second qualification may be far-reaching. It results from the
necessity of using data on outstanding debt to derive net borrowing,
and of estimating net income as a residual. The implication of such a
basis for our estimates—that net borrowing, i.e., net changes in debt
outstanding, should be associated either with gross capital formation
or with total additions to assets—may be unwarranted.
This point can be illustrated by a simple example. Assume that
farmer Jones, having reached retirement age, sells his farm to young
Smith, a new member of the farm community, and accepts a mortgage
from Smith on the heretofore debt-free farm. Other conditions remain-
ing the same, mortgage debt of the farming community increases, and
we have a plus entry on the sources-of-funds side, and neither capital
formation nor addition to financial assets on the uses-of-funds side. But
the net income item on the sources-of-funds side, which is a residual,
will be reduced to maintain the equality of sources and uses. Com-
parison over time will then show, other conditions being equal, a
rise in the share of net borrowing in gross capital formation (or total
uses) and a decline in the share of internal financing accounted for by
a drop in the share of financing from net income. The example in-
dicates the replacement of savings originally invested in agriculture
(the equity of farmer Jones) by debt. Such shifts are quite common in
a sector like agriculture, where exits and entries are frequent.
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Another typical situation involves transfers within the body of capi-
tal users, disregarding entries and exits. If one farmer sells his land to
another at a higher price than he paid—the buyer using funds bor-
rowed from financial institutions to cover part of the purchase price—
debt increases without any gross capital formation, as we measure it.
However, in this case, the seller would be recorded—if he stays within
agriculture—as a unit that added to its cash balances or financial re-
serves or to its real capital assets. If our data are complete, and we con-
sider the capital users in agriculture a closed group, changes in debt
(except through foreclosure) must be reflected in the uses of funds.
But the lines of connection with real capital formation could not be
distinguished from the lines of connection with additions to financial
assets.
Because of these effects of transactions, either across the boundaries
of agriculture or within agriculture, on the meaning of the net bor-
rowing and net income items on the sources-of-funds side, it is im-
portant to recognize that the volume of such transactions is quite large.
We have data on the number of voluntary sales of farms (as distinct
from foreclosures) per thousand farms, from 1912 to date. The annual
percentage of all farms passing through voluntary sales varied from a
low of about 1.6 to 2 in the early 1930's (when sales were difficult and
foreclosures ran high) to a peak of almost 6 in the late l940's.' Cumu-
lation of these percentages over a decade, assuming no repeats, would
show that one-half of all farms changed hands within a decade. This
is, of course, an exaggeration, but the point is that in agriculture, as
in all sectors dominated by small business units, change in ownership
is quite frequent. The transactions involving already existing com-
plexes of assets must therefore be far greater than those involving new
gross capital formation.
It follows that, the evidence in Table 35 can be interpreted as shed-
ding light on trends in internal and external financing of capital for-
mation (real and financial) in agriculture only under the highly re-
strictive assumption that the proportion of changes in debt (and of
the residual item, net income invested) that financed acquisition of
real and financial assets, as distinct from the proportion that financed
entries and exits, showed no definite trend over time. And any state-
ment concerning trends in the shares of financing of gross real capital
formation is based upon the further assumption that the proportion of
15SeeTostlebe, op.cit., Table37, P. 144.
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changes in debt (and the proportion of net income) that financed
acquisition of real assets showed no distinct trend over time. We
have no data by which to test the validity of these assumptions.
But it is relevant to note that, while the number of farms increased
from 5.7 million in 1900 to 6.8 million in 1935, it declined to 5.4 mil-
lion in 1950, and the reduction may have continued beyond that year.
Insofar as the reduction toward the end of the period meant a larger
number of exits, and to the extent that these were accompanied by
withdrawal of savings from agriculture and their replacement, if only
partly, by assumption o debt, such additions to debt should not be
assigned to financing of new capital formation (gross or net). If the in-
ference just made is valid, it only reinforces the conclusion suggested
by Table 35, that the ratio of internal financing to capital formation
rose.
NONFARM UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
Data on capital formation and financing for this sector of the economy
are meager and unreliable. We are fortunate to have the estimates de-
rived by Goldsmith.16 These estimates, as Goldsmith emphasizes, are
based upon a rough allocation between the corporate and unincorpo-
rated sectors, and must be interpreted with caution.
The relevant data are summarized in Table 36. It would have been
possible, using Goldsmith's estimates, to distribute gross savings, or re-
tention, between capital consumption allowances and net income
(with all estimates on an original cost basis of depreciation, with net
income unadjusted for effects of inventory revaluation and for the
difference between original cost and replacement bases of depreciation,
and with capital formation including changes in inventory in current
valuation). But the basis for this distribution would be too tenuous to
yield significant results.
The table runs only through 1949. But one may assume that, as for
agriculture (see Table 35), the share of borrowing in total uses of funds
in the period 1950—1955 would show a rise over that in 1945—1949. In
both cases, the great volumes of financial assets accumulated during
the war years, when the supply of capital goods was restricted, were the
major source of funds during 1945—1949; and in the later years, greater
reliance was placed on external funds.17
16 W.Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. I (Prince-
ton University Press, 1955).
17Thatnet additions to cash and government securities of nonfarm unincorporated





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Trends in Financing of Capital Formation
With this assumption concerning the movement of the ratios in
1950—1955, the broad conclusion can be stated simply: there is little
evidence of a long-term trend in the ratio of external (or internal)
sources to either gross capital formation or total additions to assets.
This conclusion is based largely upon the entries for three periods:
1897—1914, 1920—1929, and 1945—1949 extended on the basis of what
probably happened during 1950_1955.18 We exclude the quinquennium
1915—1919 as too much affected by World War I, and the period from
1930 through 1944 as too distorted by the depression of the 1930's and
the effects of World War II.
The ratio of gross retention (internal funds) to gross capital forma-
tion was 0.93 in 1897—1914, 0.78 during the 1920's, 0.88 in 1945—1949,
and either the same or somewhat lower in 1950—1955, showing no defi-
nite movement. Likewise, the ratio of gross retention to total additions
to assets was 0.71 in 1897—1914, 0.78 in the 1920's, 0.71 in 1945—1949,
and probably dropped in 1950—1955. This indicates rough stability in
the ratio of internal sources, and hence of borrowing, to total addi-
tions to assets. Finally, the ratio of changes in debt to gross capital
formation was 0.39 in 1879—1914, 0.22 in the 1920's, 0.36 in 1945—1949,
and probably rose in 1950—1955—again indicating the absence of any
significant long-term movement.
In the nonfarm unincorporated business sector, we find, then, long-
term trends in the shares of external and internal financing different
from those observed in nonfarm residential construction and in agri-
culture. As pointed out, the comparison with nonfarm residential con-
struction is scarcely warranted in view of the basic difference in the
measures used for these two sectors. The reason for movement different
from that in agriculture can only be conjectured. Agriculture shifted
from extensive expansion before 1930 to intensive growth after that.
There was a marked rise, particularly during 1940—1955, in the ratio
of its per capita income to the countrywide (or nonfarm) average in-
come. No such major shifts took place in nonfarm unincorporated
business, which in Table 36 is heavily dominated by distributive trades
and (a distant second) the construction industry. While the unincor-
porated business sector was losing ground, in that its proportion of the
1946—1949, the net change would be —$2.0 billion, instead of +$2.0 billion, as shown
in Table 36 for 1946-1949 (see Goldsmith, op. cit., Table U-li, p. 869).
18Wehave, in fact, made rough estimates for 1950—1955, primarily to complete
the summary in Tables 45 and 46, below. But these estimates are too rough for
use in the discussion of the specific sector.
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activity of either the whole nonfarm capital using field or of that
within each respective industry was falling off, there is no evidence of
change in its character and in its per capita income relative to other
branches of the economy as great as that in agriculture.
It need hardly be stressed that the qualifications of the conclusions
for agriculture from Table 35 apply equally to the conclusions for non-
farm unincorporated business from Table 36. In this sector also, exits
and entries are quite frequent; and, moreover, shifts from unincorpo-
rated to corporate status are common. There is no basis for evaluating
the possible effects of continuous and large exits from and entries into
the sector of nonfarm unincorporated business. It may be assumed,
however, that the shift from noncorporate to corporate status, insofar
as it withdraws the larger units which, because of their size, may ex-
ploit the advantages of incorporation, is partly responsible for the
absence of significant trends in Table 36. To put it differently: if one
could assume that units remained unincorporated no matter how large
they grew, and if such larger units can and do rely on greater use of
external funds, the trend toward larger size might have produced an
upward trend in the share of external financing. In that sense, the
movement toward corporate status makes for stability of structure, and
hence of the type of financing practices, within the nonfarm unincorpo-
rated sector.
ALL CORPORATIONS
Here we deal with what is quantitatively and analytically the most
important segment of capital formation inasmuch as business corpo-
rations provide the auspices, in times free from war pressures and re-
strictions, for most of the real capital formation in the country. The
trend in the dependence of corporate financing on internal versus ex-
ternal sources is then a major factor in evaluating the degree to which
business capital formation is subject to the test of the capital funds
market. Of course, even internal sources must meet the test of the
market. Depreciation allowances must be earned if they are to be avail-
able for financing, or to put it differently, net retained profits must
be positive. Thus, the market passes upon a business firm by paying
the price that yields positive net profits, and permits the firm to finance
replacement or expansion from within. External financing must meet
even more stringent tests, and it is of interest to observe the extent to
which the financing of capital formation is subjected to those tests.
We observed in Chapters 3 and 4 that, in general, the ratio of capital
consumption allowances to gross capital formation rose distinctly over
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the period from 1870, as shown by ratios based on long, two-decade to
three-decade spans. This finding has little bearing upon the financing
of residential housing, since, as already indicated, individual house-
holds are the main capital users, and we cannot expect the capital con-
sumption charges to be earned and made directly available within the
unit as an internal source of funds. In agriculture, we found some re-
flection of this trend in the rise in the ratio of capital consumption
allowances to gross real capital formation. The data on nonfarm un-
incorporated business firms did not warrant separating capital con-
sumption allowances from net retained income. However, for the ag-
gregate of business corporations in the United States, we can expect
that, assuming no distinct contrary trend in the share of corporate
savings (net undistributed profits), the share of capital consumption
allowances in real gross capital formation will show a rise. This, all
other conditions being equal, should make for a rise in the share of
internal financing.
Itisthis hypothesis that provides the rationale for Table 37.
Through most of the period it is based on Goldsmith's estimates, capi-
tal consumption allowances and net undistribu ted profits (corporate
savings) being adjusted for effects of inventory revaluation and the
difference between original cost and replacement cost of depreciation
reserves. The series are thus comparable with those on capital formation
in Chapters 3 and 4. For the years since 1950, however, we cannot adjust
for the difference between original and replacement cost of deprecia-
tion charges, although we can adjust for effects of changes in inventory
valuation.
Table 87 suggests some conclusions, and also points to the difficulties
of inferring long-term trends over the period since 1900. We can try
to discern the long-term trends in two ways. First, following the pro-
cedure used earlier, we can eliminate the periods of war and distortion
due to cyclical depressions, and observe the ratios over the periods
marked by substantial capital formation under relatively prosperous
conditions. Thus, if we concentrate our attention upon three periods—
1897—1914, 1920—1929, and 1946—1956—we find that the ratio of capi-
tal consumption allowances to gross capital formation rose from about
0.39 in the first, to 0.56 in the second, and can be roughly estimated
at 0.60 in the last.'° This shows some rise in the ratio of capital con-
19TheGoldsmith series were extrapolated to 1956 by the Department of Corn-
merce estimates, by applying to the ratios in columns 6 to 8, line 8, the movement
of the ratios from 1946—1949 to 1946—1956, i.e., from line 10 to 12. In averaging the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Trends in Financing of Capital Formation
sumption allowances to gross capital formation. In the same periods,
the ratio of gross retention to gross capital formation moved from 0.72
to 0.84, to 0.81. Here also the share of internal sources rose, but not
consistently.
The other approach to establishing the long-term trends is by in.
cluding all periods, even the exceptional ones of war or other unusual
conditions. On the theory that those exceptional periods were the
product of the antecedent years—which were consequently also ex-
ceptional because they gave rise to exceptional effects—and that those
exceptional spans were in turn followed by periods that represent re-
actions and thus were also in some way unusual, we should include all
periods. The problem is how to calculate averages that represent a
balance of distorting elements. The three long periods in lines 13 to
15 are an attempt at such averaging. It may be deficient, particularly
in that the span from 1940 through 1956 represents a less complete
period than the preceding two. The ratio of capital consumption allow-
ances to gross capital formation, thus derived, moved in about the
same fashion as that based on the other procedure: it rose from 0.39 in
1897—1914 to 0.71 in 1915—1939, and declined to 0.63 in 1940—1956,
but still showed a significant long.term rise. The proportion of total
internal sources to gross capital formation rose fairly steadily over the
three long periods—from 0.72 to 0.78 to 0.88. Even if we allow for
exaggeration in the last period, for which the average might be re-
duced if more recent years were included, we may still conclude that
there has been a long-term rise since 1900 in the ratio of corporate
gross retention to corporate gross capital formation.
It is worth noting that the rise shown in Table 37 in the ratio of
gross retention or internal funds to gross capital formation was due
exclusively to the rise in the ratio of capital consumption allowances
to the latter. The ratio of retained profits to gross capital formation did
not show the long-term rise. Thus, in the three normal periods, 1897—
1914, 1920—1929, and 1946—1956, the ratio of retained profits to gross
capital formation was 0.33, 0.28, and 0.21, respectively, suggesting a
decline rather than a rise. Likewise, in the three all-inclusive periods,
1897—1914, 1915—1939, and 1940—1956, the ratio of retained profits to
gross capital formation was 0.33, 0.07, and 0.25, respectively—again
indicating no long-term rise.
Table 37 also shows movements of the ratio of retained profits
(corporate savings) to net capital formation. For reasons already in-
dicated, corporate savings cannot be assigned to the financing of net
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real capital formation alone. Yet we may ask whether those savings
were sufficient to finance net additions to capital, and whether there
were any visible trends in the ratio of the one to the other.
The entries in column 8 indicate that, on the whole, the ratio of net
retention to net capital formation did not rise—unless we include the
war affected period, 1940—1945. The ratio was 0.54 in 1897—1914, 0.64
in 1920—1929, and 0.55 in 1946—1956. Only if we compare 1897—1914
with 1940—1956 does the proportion rise—from 0.54 to 0.66. Thus,
while the ratio of gross retention to gross capital formation definitely
rose, that of net retention to net capital formation showed no sig-
nificant rise. This conclusion is compatible with our other findings
of a rise in the share of capital consumption allowances in gross capital
formation, and of a slight decline (or constancy) in the ratio of net
retained profits to gross capital formation.
In Table 37 gross capital formation is adjusted for effects of in-
ventory revaluation; net capital formation and retained net profits
are adjusted for both the inventory revaluation effects and those due
to the shift of depreciation to replacement from original cost basis; and
capital consumption allowances are estimated on replacement rather
than original cost basis. These adjusted totals differ from the totals
recorded in corporate accounting and hence from those presumably
recognized by entrepreneurs. Yet economic analysis warrants their
use—for they do indicate what properly measured gross (and net) re-
tention means relative to properly measured capital formation. It is
of interest to study the ratios based on unadjusted totals, i.e., those re-
flecting changes in inventory in current valuation, and capital con-
sumption allowances and net undistributed income as measured by
customary accounting practices. Those ratios are given in Table 38.
Since the entries in this table reflect the fluctuations in prices more
than do those in Table 37 (if prices were constant, the two sets of en-
tries would be identical), the ratios show more conspicuous variations,
and long-term trends are all the more difficult to discern. Yet some sig-
nificant differences between Tables 37 and 38 with respect to long-
term trends can be seen.
First, whereas when we use the adjusted totals the ratio of capital
consumption allowances to gross capital formation shows a distinct
upward trend, when we use the unadjusted totals the long-term rise
is much reduced. Thus in Table 37, the ratio rose from 0.39 in 1897—
1914 to 0.60 in 1946—1956 or to 0.63 in 1940—1956. In Table 38 the rise















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Share of Internal Funds
0.41 in 1940—1956. The much greater rise in prices of capital goods in
the recent decades than that which preceded 1897—1914 reduced the
ratio of capital consumption allowances at original cost to capital
formation in current prices much more after 1940 than it did after
1897. There were similar effects of differences in movement of inven-
tory values.
Second, while the shift from the adjusted to the unadjusted totals
reduced the rise in the proportion of capital consumption allowances
to gross capital formation, it had the opposite effect on the proportion
of net retained profits to gross capital formation. In Table 37, the
proportion declined from 0.33 in 1897—1914 to 0.21 in 1946—1956 (or
0.25 in 1940—1956). In Table 38, the corresponding ratio rose from
0.35 in 1897—1914 to 0.39 in 1946—1956 (or 0.42 in 1940—1956). The price
movements that reduced the ratio of capital consumption charges
raised the ratio of net profits.
Third, the opposite effects of the shift from the adjusted to unad-
justed totals upon the trends in the proportions of capital consumption
allowances and of net profits to gross capital formation largely offset
each other. As a result, the movement in the ratio of total gross re
tention to gross capital formation in the unadjusted totals is about
the same as in the adjusted. Thus in Table 37, this ratio rose from
0.72 in 1897—1914 to 0.81 in 1946—1956 (or 0.88 in 1940—1956); the
corresponding ratio in Table 38 rose from 0.71 to 0.78 (or 0.83). The
rise in the share of internal financing in the unadjusted totals is thus
only slightly less than in the adjusted.
Finally, the unadjusted totals show a different movement in the
ratio of retained profits to net capital formation. This ratio in Table
38 rose from 0.54 in 1897—1914 to 0.63 in 1946—1956 (or 0.71 in 1940—
1956) in contrast to the stability in Table 37 (0.54 in 1897—1914, and
0.55 in 1946—1956, but 0.66 in 1940—1956).
Nonfinancial Corporations
We now consider the total uses and sources of corporate funds (Table
39). Here we use Goldsmith's series (extended through 1956 by the
Commerce estimates). These series exclude financial corporations.
(Their inclusion in Tables 37 and 38 did not matter because they ac-
count for minor fractions of the totals involved.) Inventories are taken
at current valuation, and capital consumption allowances are on an
original cost basis—with a corresponding effect on net retained prof-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Share of Internal Funds
of the ratio of all internal sources (gross retention) to total sources or
uses of funds, the two totals being conceptually identical.
For short, relatively normal periods—1901—19l2, 1923—1929, and
1946—1956—the ratio of capital consumption allowances to total uses
of funds was 0.34, 0.37, and 0.38, respectively (column 10). Its move-
ment is quite similar to that of the ratio of capital consumption allow-
ances to gross capital formation in Table 38 from 1897—1914 to 1946—
1956. There was also a rise—not large, but perhaps significant—in the
averages over the long periods, 1901—1922, 1913—1939, and 1940—1956,
the ratio moving from 0.34 to 0.58 to 0.40.
The upward trend is also slight when we compare total internal
funds with total uses (column 9). The ratio was 0.55 in 1901—1912,
0.55 in 1923—1929, and 0.61 in 1946—1956. The change is equally slight
in the ratio for the longer periods: from 0.59 in 1901—1922 to 0.64 in
1940—1956.
Just as in Tables 37 and 38 we studied the movement in the ratio of
net retention (corporate savings) to net capital formation, so here we
can observe the movement in the ratios of corporate savings and ex-
ternal sources to net total uses, i.e. total net of capital consumption
allowances (see columns 11 and 12). The ratio of net savings to net
total uses is stable, when we compare 1901—1922 (0.38) with 1923—1929
(0.28) and 1946—1956 (0.37); but the inclusion of 1940—1945 introduces
a slight rise—to 0.40—in the ratio for 1940—1956. The ratio of external
sources to net total uses also shows no marked trend: it was 0.62 in
1901—1922, 0.81 in 1913—1939, 0.63 in 1946—1956, and 0.60 in 1940—
1956. Perhaps it is safest to infer that there were no significant long-
term trends in the ratios of net retention and external financing to net
total uses or sources.
Before passing on to major subgroups within the total body of corpo-
rations, it may be useful to recapitulate the findings.
1. For totals adjusted for effects of inventory revaluation and of the
difference between original cost and replacement cost bases of capital
consumption allowances, the ratios of both the latter and gross reten-
tion to gross real capital formation show a rise over the half century.
2. Again for adjusted totals, the ratio of net retention (corporate
savings) to net real capital formation shows no significant rise over the
period, unless we include 1940—1945 in the last period.
3. When we shift the analysis to unadjusted totals, more directly
relevant to the study of financing flows, the rise in the ratio of capital
consumption allowances to gross capital formation is greatly reduced.
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By contrast, the shift to unadjusted totals produces a rise in the ratio
of net retention (corporate savings) to gross capital formation. With
these two effects of the shift from adjusted to unadjusted totals largely
offsetting each other, the ratio of total gross retention to gross capital
formation in the unadjusted totals still shows a rise.
4. The ratio of net retention (corporate savings) to net capital for-
mation in the unadjusted totals shows a rise, whereas the corresponding
ratio for the adjusted totals shows stability, unless we include the period
1940—1945.
5. Again for the unadjusted totals, the ratios of both capital con-
sumption allowances and gross retention to total uses show but a minor
rise, distinctly smaller than that in the ratios to gross capital forma-
tion.
6. The establishment of the trends suggested above was greatly af-
fected by extremely wide variations in the ratios from period to period,
even for periods as long as twenty years.
7. The moderate magnitude of the rise in the ratio of internal fi-
nancing (gross retention) to total uses (in unadjusted totals) may be
attributed to a combination of offsetting trends. One trend is the rise
in the share of capital consumption allowances, when calculated on
the basis of prices comparable with those underlying current capital
formation (that is, in the adjusted totals). Offsetting this trend are: (a)
the reducing effect, in depreciation accounting based on original cost,
of the growing difference between the current and past prices of capi-
tal goods—an effect due to the greater rate of rise in those prices since
the 1930's than in the periods preceding the 1920's and particularly
before 1918; and (b) the proportional increase of nondurable assets in
recent decades.
Mining and Manufacturing Corporations
For this major group we have a special analysis in Dobrovoisky's part
of the joint monograph with Creamer and Borenstein.2° Table 40
presents a comparison of plant and equipment expenditures (exclud-
ing inventory additions) with gross retention and its components.
The conclusions are briefly summarized.
1. The ratio of gross retention to plant and equipment expendi-
tures shows an upward trend over the period 1900—1953. On an unad-
justed basis (line 7b), the ratio was 0.88 in 1900—1914,L04 in 1920—1929
20DanielCreamer, Sergei Dobrovoisky, and Israel Borenstein, Capital in Manu-
facturing and Mining: Its Formation and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960).
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Cosu'AlusoN OF GROSS RETENTION AND NET SECURrrY IssuEs wms PLANT AND
EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES, MINING AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1900—1953




















1. Plant & equipment expenditures 1,014 2,041 2,461 1,736 3,171 9,345
2. Capital consumption allowances
2a.Adjusted 484 1,366 2,291 1,890 2,769 5,866
2b.Unadjusted 432 1,170 2,065 2,018 2,763 5,332
3. Net retained profits
3a.Adjusted 429 1,038 837 —824 1,447 3,284
3b.Unadjusted 459 1,968 503—1,264 2,002 5,092
4. Gross retention
4a.Adjusted, lines 2a and 3a 913 2,404 3,128 1,0664,216 9,150
4b.Unadjusted, lines 2b and 3b 891 3,138 2,568 754 4,76510,424
5. Net capital formation
5a.Adjusted, line I minus line 2a 530 675 169 —154 402 3,479
5b.Unadjusted, line 1 minus line 2b 582 871 396 —282 408 4,013
6. Net security issues 314 488 870 10 206 2,032
Ratios
7a. Line 4a to line 1 090 1.18 1.27 0.61 1.33 0.98
7b. Line 4b to line 1 0.88 1.54 1.04 0.43 1.50 1.12
8. Line 6 to line 1 0.31 0.24 0.35 0.01 0.06 0.22
9a. Line 2a to line 1 0.48 0.67 0.93 1.09 0.87 0.63
9b. Line 2b to line 1 0.43 0.57 0.84 1.16 0.87 0.57
lOa. Line 3a to line 1 0.42 0.31 0.34—0.47 0.46 0.35
lob. Line 3b to line 1 0.43 0.96 0.20—0.73 0.63 0.54
ha. Line 3a to line 5a 0.81 1.54 4.95 — 3.60 0.94
lib. Line 3b to line 5b 0.79 2.26 1.27 — 4.91 1.27
12. Line 6 to line Sb 0.54 0.56 2.20 — 0.50 0.51
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
SOURCE: Basedon estimates by Sergei Dobrovolskyin the joint monograph with
Daniel Creamer and Israel Borenstein, Capital in Manufacturing and Mining: Its Forma-
tion and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960), Tables 40 and 41, pp. 121 and 131.
The estimates by Dobrovolsky are annual average values for successive business
cycles. For the present table, we combined the averages without regard to the varying
duration of the cycles. The entries for 1900—1914 are arithmetic means of the annual
average values for the cycles, 1900—1904, 1904—1908, 1908—1911, and 1911—1914; those
for 1914-1919 are averages for a single cycle; those for 1920—1929 are means of averages
for three peak-to-peak cycles, 1920—1923, 1923—1926, and 1926—1929. The entries for
1929—1937 and 1938—1946 are averages for single cycles; those for 1946—1953 are
means of annual averages for two cycles, 1946—1949 and 1949—1953. In calculating the
cycle averages, Dobrovolsky gave the terminal year values half weight.
The estimate of capital consumption allowances is adjusted for the difference be-
tween original cost and replacement bases; the estimate of retained profits is adjusted
also for the effects of changes in inventory valuation.
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and 1.12 in 1946—1953. While the inclusion of 1954—1956 and later
years might reduce the last ratio somewhat, it would probably still be
significantly above that in 1900—19 14. The rise in the ratio of adjusted
gross retention to plant and equipment expenditures (line 7a) was
somewhat smaller, but still suggests an upward trend.
2. The ratio of capital consumption allowances to plant and equip-
ment expenditures (lines 9a and 9b) also rose—from 0.43 or 0.48 in
1900—1914, to 0.57 or 0.63 in 1946—1953. The movement is quite similar
to that of the ratio observed for all corporations in Table 37, but not in
Table 38.
3. No such clear trends emerge in the ratio of net retained profits
to plant and equipment expenditures (lines lOa and lob). On an
adjusted basis it was 0.42 in 1909—1914, 0.34 in 1920—1929, and 0.35
in 1946—1953. By contrast, when we use the unadjusted totals, the
ratio declined from 0.45 in 1900—1914 to 0.20 in 1920—1929, but then
rose to 0.54 in 1946—1953. Our judgment as to the trend in the con-
tribution of net profits to the financing of plant and equipment expend-
itures depends upon the concept. If we adhere to estimates of capital
consumption allowances and net profit corresponding to the economic
accounting approach, the rise in the ratio of gross retention to gross
plant and equipment expenditures can be seen to be due to the rise
in the relative weight of capital consumption allowances, not of net
retained profits. Here again the conclusions agree with those derived
for all corporations, in Table 37.
4. The ratio of net security issues to plant and equipment expendi-
tures (line 8) shows no rise, but rather some suggestion of a decline.
This ratio was 0.31 in 1900—1914, 0.35 in 1920—1929, and 0.22 in 1946—
1953. The inclusion of 1954—1956 and later years might raise the last
ratio and reduce the decline substantially.
5. On both the adjusted and unadjusted bases, the ratio of net
profit retention to net durable capital formation (lines ha and llb)
rose: from 0.81 or 0.79 in 1900—1914 to 0.94 or 1.27 in 1946—1953. But
in 1920—1929 it was either at the 1946—1953 level or much higher, and
the movement therefore is not sufficiently consistent over time to be
given much weight.
6. The latter is true also of the ratio of net securities issues to net
durable capital formation (line 12): on an unadjusted basis it was
0.54 in 1900—1914, 0.51 in 1946—1953, but as high as 2.20 in 1920—1929.
We may now ask what the trends in the shares of total uses of funds
were. The summary of the relevant data is provided in Table 41, also
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TABLE 41
TOTAL, INTERNAL, AND EXTERNAL FINANCING,
LARGE MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1900—1953




















1. Total financing 110 744 550 464 3,093 7,350
2. Expenditures on physical assets n.a. 451 417 452 2,070 6,156
3. Other, line 1minusline 2 n.a. 293 133 12 1,023 1,194
4. Internal financing 77 447 532 445 2,348 4,910
4a.Capital consumption allowances 34 125 270 409 1,265 2,117
4b.Undistributed earnings 43 322 262 37 1,083 2,793
5. External financing, line I minus line4 32 296 18 19 745 2,440
Ratios
6. Line 4 to line 1 0.70 0.60 0.97 0.96 0.76 0.67
6a. Line 4a to line 1 0.31 0.17 0.49 0.88 0.41 0.29
7. Line4toline 2 na. 0.99 1.28 0.98 1.13 0.80
7a. Line 4a to line 2 n.a. 0.28 0.65 0.90 0.61 0.34
8. Line 5toline 2 n.a. 0.66 0.04 0.04 0.36 0.40
Because of rounding, details will not necessarily add to total.
n.a.not available.
aOmittingone-half of 1923.
For sources and method of averaging cycle data, see notes to Table 40, and Creamer,
et al., op. cit., Tables 44and46, pp. 142—143 and 148. There are three distinct samples:
one collected by NBER, relating to 1900—1910; the second, also from NBER, used in
cols. 2—4; and the third, from the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, used in
cols. 5 and 6.
based on Dobrovoisky's analysis. But here serious qualifications attach
to the representativeness of the data. They are for large manufacturing
corporations alone, and the sample is quite small, particularly for
the years preceding the 1920's when only 14 to 50 corporations were
included. Whatever conclusions we derive from the estimates must
be viewed as highly tentative. This table, like Table 39, is based upon
business accounting, unadjusted totals.
7. The ratio of internal financing, i.e. gross retention, to total uses
(line 6) fails to show any upward trend over the period. It was 0.70
in 1900—1910, 0.97 in 1920—1929, and 0.67 in 1946—1953. This rela-
tive constancy over the long period in the ratio of internal (and hence,
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external) financing to all uses is to be compared with the slight rise
in the internal financing ratio for all nonfinancial corporations in
Table 39.
8. The ratios of the two components of gross retention—capital con-
sumption allowances and undistributed earnings—to total uses were
also relatively constant over the period (see line 6a). It is difficult to
say whether the absence here of the trends observed in the ratios for
all corporations in Table 39 represents a significant difference.
The Regulated Industries
A similarly brief exploration of the trends in financing of capital
formation, or rather total uses, can be undertaken for four of the
principal components of the regulated industries (all corporate) on
the basis of the detailed analysis in Ulmer's monograph.2' The
relevant data are assembled in Table 42.
In contrast with the findings for all corporations, and for the mining
and manufacturing sectors of the corporate group, there are pro-
nounced trends here in the shares of internal and external financing
in total uses and sources of funds. For steam railroads the share of
gross retention (internal funds) in total uses rose from slightly over
two percentage points in 1880—1890 to over 100 per cent in 1941—1949.
The rise was less sharp for telephones, but here also the 40 per cent
gross retention ratio in 1941—1950 was far greater than the 6 per cent
ratio in 1891—1902. There is a similar movement in the financing of
total uses in electric light and power, and street and electric railways.
Two comments are relevant. As Ulmer points out, the last period,
1941—1949, 1941—1950, or 1938—1950, combines two rather dissimilar
periods: the war years, when gross retention was quite large in rela-
tion to total uses of funds, and the postwar years, when the ratio of
gross retention to total uses must have dropped considerably. It follows
that the ratio of gross retention to total uses for 1946—1956, if avail-
able, would be appreciably lower than that shown for the last period
in Table 42. Yet it is almost certain that it would be higher than the
very low ratio characterizing the early periods in the table.
Second, this upward trend in the ratio of gross retention to total
uses of funds would persist even if we compared 1946—1956 with the
first decade of the century—omitting the pre-1900 periods for greater
comparability with the span studied for all the other sectors. A rough
21 Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public
Utilities: Its Formation and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960).
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CAPITAL FORMATION FINANCING, FOUR MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE
REGULATED INDUSTRIES, 1880—1950
(amounts in millions ofdollars)
Industrial Component and
















2. Gross capital formation





6. Changes in liabilities
7. Dates
Telephones
8. Gross capital formation





12. Changes in liabilities
Electric Light and Power
Percentages of Total Uses
(Sources)
15. Gross capital expenditures
16. Other assets
17. Gross retention
18. Changes in liabilities
Street and Electric Railways
19. Dates
20. Gross capital formation
Percentages of Total Uses
(Sources)
21. Gross capital expenditures
22. Other assets
23. Gross retention
24. Changes in liabilities
1880°— 1893° 1907°— 1914°.- 1921b_ 1931b_ 1941b_
1890° 1907° 1916d 1920's 1930d 1940d 1949d
2,687 2,978 5,280 3,021 8,088 2.874 7020
86.5 76.7 111.1 93.4 115.3 117.6 84.9
13.5 23.3 —11.1 6.6 —15,4 —17.7 15.0
2.4 9.5 42.9 52.7 94.8 97.4 101.6
97.6 90.4 57.2 47.3 5.1 2.6 —1.6
189l"° 1903b_ 1913b_ 1921b_ 1931l5 194t'
19O2' 1912d 19206 1930d 1940d 1950d
382 905 948 3,708 2,092 7,083
87.0 86.5 96.3 88.6 110.8 93,5
13.0 13.6° 3.7 11.4 —10.9 6.5
6.3 19.6 58.3 43.1 99.8 40.5






Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
° July 1 of year.
bJanuary1 of year.
° June 30 of year.
d December 31 of year.
aIncludinginventories.
inventories.
Souxcu: Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities: Its
Formation and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960), Tables 46—49, pp. 150—153.
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calculation indicates that the share of gross retention in total uses for,
say, 1901—1910, would be at most 20 per cent for the combined total
of the four regulated industries in Table 42; and the corresponding
percentage for 1946—1956 would probably not be appreciably smaller
than that for 1941—1950 (which works out to about 62).
Thus for these regulated industries there has been a marked upward
trend in the ratio of gross retention (internal financing) to all uses of
funds over the period (since 1900), during which all corporations and
the mining and manufacturing sectors of the corporate group were
characterized by only a slight rise in the ratio. The reasons for this
trend in the regulated industries have been discussed by Ulmer, and
there is no need to enlarge upon them here. The major explanation lies
in the sharp slowing down in the rate of growth of these industries for
which, in their early extensive growth, capital consumption allowances
and income retention were insufficient to finance the needs for rapid
expansion of plant and equipment. No such sharp deceleration in the
rate of growth of all corporations or of the mining and manufacturing
corporations occurred, if only because the historical period covered
does not encompass the early phases of these groups, as it does those
for the regulated industries.
One technical point, an apparent inconsistency, must be accounted
for. How was it possible for one major component of all corporations,
the regulated group, to show a significantly rising trend in the ratio
of internal financing (gross retention) to total uses, and for all corpo.
rations not to show such a large rise in this ratio? The question seems
particularly relevant since another big component of all corporations,
the mining and manufacturing group, does not show any offsetting
decline in the ratio.
The answer lies in the effect of combining groups whose ratios of
internal-external financing to total uses differ, and whose weights
change over time. A rough calculation will demonstrate the point.
Using Table 42 and Ulmer's more detailed tables, we can set total
gross capital formation in the four regulated industries for 1901—1912 at
about $9.8 billion in current prices; and, if we assume that additions to
other assets accounted for another 10 per cent, total uses would amount
to roughly $10.8 billion. For 1941—1950 a similar calculation yields
gross capital formation of about $25 billion, and an allowance of 7
per cent for changes in other assets brings total uses to about $26.8
billion. In Table 39, total uses for 1901—1912 were $40 billion, and
for 1941—1950 they would be about $200 billion (they were $186 billion
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for 1940—1949). It follows that the share of total uses for the four
regulated industries was 27 per cent in 1901—1912 and only 13.4 per
cent in 1941—1950.
Also from Table 42 we can derive the ratio of gross retention to all
uses for the four regulated industries—roughly 0.2 in 1901—1912 and
0.62 in 1941—1950. Gross retention in these industries amounted there-
fore to $2.2 billion in 1901—1912 and to $16.6 billion in 1941—1950.
We know from Table 39 that the corresponding ratio for all corpora-
tions was 0.55 in 1901—1912 and about 0.70 in 1941—1950 (the latter is
high because it includes the World War II period). If we apply these
ratios to total uses for all corporations, we secure gross retention of
$22 billion and $140 billion, respectively.
We can now subtract total uses and gross retention for the four
regulated industries from the corresponding totals for all corporations
in order to calculate the ratios for the large nonregulated industries
residual. Total uses in the first period (1901—1912) amounted to $29.2
billion, the corresponding gross retention was $19.8 billion, and the
ratio was 0.68. In 1941—1950 total uses amounted to $173.2 billion,
gross retention to $123.4 billion, and the ratio was 0.71—not very dif-
ferent from the ratio for 1901—1912. The point is that the ratio for
all corporations was kept from rising because the relative weight of
the nonregulated industries increased from 1901—1912 to 1941—1950.
And, because in the recent decades the gross retention-total uses ratio
for these industries was generally lower than that for the regulated
group, their increasing weight tended to depress the over-all ratio and
thus offset the effects of the rise in the ratio for the regulated industries.
This calculation is necessarily crude, and applies to 1941—1950. But
if we could repeat it for 1946—1956, we could demonstrate that the
rise in the internal financing ratio for these regulated industries in
that decade, compared with the pre-World War I period (and perhaps
even with the 1920's), was offset by the shift in weight in total uses of
funds between the regulated and the other sectors within all corpo-
rations, not by offsetting movements in the ratio within the nonregu-
lated industry corporations.
GOVERNMENTS
In the discussion of the financing of governments, we deal with a group
of institutions whose pattern in the use of borrowed funds and re-
tained income is radically different from that of the major private sec-
tors of the economy. Governments, particularly the federal, can and
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do borrow funds for what may be viewed as current consumption
rather than addition to financial assets or real capital formation. This
practice may be followed by some private economic units, e.g., house-
holds and business firms. But they are obviously a small proportion of
the total private sector over any long period, and their borrowing for
these purposes is necessarily limited. Unless the use of the borrowed
funds improves the economic position of the private unit (returns it to
solvency), further borrowing will cease. No such limitations, at least
within similarly narrow confines, apply to borrowing by central govern-
ment authorities. In times of emergency, such as a major war or depres-
sion, the governments can and are expected to borrow for defense or
counter-depression types of expenditures, neither of which adds to
the financial assets or real capital goods in the hands of governments
proper—however beneficial the expenditures may be to the rest of the
economy. We should, therefore, be prepared to find that in the case
of governments the relation between internal funds, borrowing, and
total uses of funds, and real capital formation bears no resemblance
to that in the private sectors discussed so far.
However, in this respect, at least in this country, state and local gov-
ernments differ substantially from the federal government, and their
financing must be reviewed separately.
State and Local Governments
The relevant data, largely from Goldsmith's work, and extended
through 1956 by rough extrapolation based on later sources, are sum-
marized in Table 43.
Internal sources are estimated as the difference between current rev-
enues of the governments and their current expenditures. This differ-
ence is the equivalent of funds from internal sources available for
replacement of or net additions to real assets, and for net additions to
financial assets, provided current expenditures do not include de-
preciation on already owned and used capital assets—an inclusion not
customarily practiced in government accounting.
The trends suggested by Table 43 are distinctive and easily estab-
lished. By and large, the ratio of internal sources to either total uses
or capital outlay rose over the period since the turn of the century.
The former ratio moved from 0.53 in 1901—1922 to 0.71 in 1913—1939,
and on to 0.79 in 1940—1956. For the shorter periods and with those of
war and depression disregarded, the ratio was 0.60 for 1901—1912, 0.68
for 1923—1929, and 0.72 for 1946—1956—the last necessarily a rough ap-
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TABLE 43
CAPITAL FORMATION FINANCING, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1901—1956






































































































13. 1946—1956 115.1 72.1 43.0 83.2 0.72 1.15
SOURCE, BY LINE
Lines 1—6. Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries, Table 74, p. 260.
Lines 7 and 8. Daniel H. Brill, ccFiflancjflg of Capital Formation," Problems of Capital
Formation (Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 19, Princeton for NBER,
1957), Table 11, p. 171.
Line 9. Capital outlay extrapolated from lines 7 and 8 by applying to state and
local construction for 1953-1956 (Economic Report of thePresident,Jan-
uary 1957, Table E-30, p. 156) the ratio of capital outlay to that series
for the earlier periods (the ratio assumed was 1.05). Likewise, total
sources were estimated on the basis of the ratio to capital outlay (the
latter was 1.61 for 1950—1952, and was set at 1.6 for 1953—1956).
Finally, external sources were estimated for the recent period on the
basis of the ratio of state and local government securities offered to net
borrowing (for the series see ibid., Table E-55, p. 184, and Table E-44,
p. 173). This ratio, which was 1.36 for 1950—1952, was set at 1.35 for
1953—1956.
proximation. The ratio of internal funds to capital outlay shows an
even greater upward trend: it rose from 0.84 in 1901—1922 to 0.93 in
1913—1939, and to 1.35 in 1940—1956. For the shorter periods it moved
from 0.84 in 1901—1912 to 0.90 in 1923—1929, and to 1.15 in 1946—1956.
The movement of the ratio of internal funds to capital outlay (but
not to total uses) can be observed for local and for state governments
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separately. This distinction suggests that the rise observed in Table 43
is due partly to an upward movement in the ratio within local gov-
ernments, but even more to the greater relative rise of capital outlay
and of gross savings by state governments than of those by local gov-
ernments. Because in recent periods, specifically since 1934, the ratio
of gross savings to capital outlay has been distinctly higher for state
than for local governments, the rise in the relative weight of the former
imparts an upward trend to the ratios in Table 43. It will be ob-
served in this connection that the rise in column 6 is particularly
sharp beginning with 1934—1939.
The ultimate explanation of these trends lies in the movement of
gross savings and of capital outlay at the two levels of government.
Apparently both, but particularly state, governments have managed
since the late 1930's to tap sources of revenue increasingly in excess
of current expenditures, enabling them to finance a greater proportion
of capital outlay without additional borrowing. Exploration of the
factors behind that trend would call for examination of the sources of
current revenue in their relation to the needs for current expenditures
as distinct from the needs for capital outlay. For instance, has such
a major source of local government current revenues as taxes on real
estate grown more rapidly in recent decades than have the current
expenditures generated by the real estate tax base, and has this differ-
ence between current revenues and expenditures, that represents gross
savings, made possible an increasing proportion of capital outlay
financing without resort to new borrowing? Likewise, has such a major
source of current revenues of state governments as the gasoline tax,
for example, increased more rapidly than have the current expendi-
tures connected with the expanded use of the automobile, with the
excess contributing to a larger share of internal financing of capital
outlay by the states? The answers to these questions would require a
detailed examination of the major sources of current revenues, and
an analysis that would link the factors responsible for trends in cur-
rent revenues with those responsible for trends in current expendi-
tures and in the needed capital outlay. Such an analysis is, unfortu-
nately, beyond the scope of the present study.
The Federal Government
It is at the federal level that the peculiar pattern of government
financing stands out most clearly (Table 44). Total uses here mean
the additions to real capital goods (gross) in the hands of the govern-
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TABLE 44
CAPITAL FORMATION FINANCING, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1901—1955
(billions of dollars)








Periods MilitaryMilitaryMilitaryMilitaryrowing Military Military
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1.1901—1912 1.8 1.8 0.94 0.94 0.8 1.0 1.0
2.1913—1922 5.8 15.0 0.93 10.13 24.7 —18.9 —9.7
3.1923—1929 1.7 2.6 0.76 1.7 —6.0 7.8 8.7
4.1930—1933 3.7 4.7 1.29 2.3 7.8 —4.2 —3.2
5.1934—1939 24.5 27.4 5.1 8.0 37.1 —12.6 —9.7
6.1940—1945 55.5 128.7 11.7 84.9 240.6 —185.1 —111.9
7.1946—1949 —9.6 0.3 4.1 14.0 —19.6 9.9 19.8
8.1946—1955 15.6 70.8 2.0
Longer Periods
9.1901—1922 7.6 16.8 1.9 11.1 25.5 —17.9 —8.7
10.1923—1939 29.9 34.7 7.2 12.0 38.9 —9.0 —4.2
11.1940—1949 45.9 129.0 15.8 98.9 221.0 —175.2 —92.1
12.1940—1955 27.3 155.7 242.6
SOURCE, BY LINE
1—7. Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries, Table 76, p. 266. For military, see text.
8. By extrapolation as follows:
Cot. 3. Based on volume of nonmilitary construction ($14.7 billion for 1950—1955,
see Economic Report of the President, January 1957, Table E-30), plus $2.0 billion
for 1950—1 955 for other capital goods, based on the 1946—1 949 average volume.
Cot. 4. See Table 14, where military capital formation is $55.2 billion.
Col. 5. Based on gross public debt of $278.7 billion at end of 1945, and $280.8 billion
at end of 1955 (see Economic Report of tile President, January 1957, Table E-45).
ment plus net additions to its financial claims. Goldsmith, from whose
estimates Table 44 was derived, does not include either military con-
struction or durable munitions among real capital goods, and this
concept is reflected in column 1. By including our estimates of the
gross additions of durable military goods (used in the corresponding
variants in Chapters 3 and 4) we secure the more comprehensive entries
in column 2.
Real capital formation represents, then, gross additions to durable
goods and net additions to inventories, whenever the latter can be
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measured. Here again we can either exclude the gross volume of mili-
tary construction and durable munitions (column 3) or include it
(column 4).
The entries for net borrowing are independent of the others, in the
sense that they are derived from data on debt outstanding, adjusted,
when necessary, to a net basis with respect to the other sectors of the
economy. Gross retention or internal funds as shown in columns 6 and
7 are residuals, derived by subtracting net borrowing (column 5) from
total uses (column 1 or 2). consequently, we have two variants of gross
retention: one that treats durable military goods as capital assets
(column 7); and another that treats them as current expenditures
(column 6).
Whichever treatment is adopted, the federal government, over any
long period that covers either a war or a major depression, borrows
much more than is needed for additions to its assets. In such a period
it borrows not only to finance asset acquisition but also to finance
current expenditures. The entries in columns 6 and 7 for all the long
periods (lines 9—11) are negative; and there is little question that the
entries for 1940—1955, if we could have calculated them, would have
been negative.
The reasons why the federal government resorts to borrowing rather
than to taxation in periods of economic or military emergency are dis-
cussed at length in Copeland's monograph,22 and need not be repeated
here. One important element is the difference between the slowness
inherent in the revenue collecting system and the speed with which
current expenditures have to be expanded in an emergency. Another is
public resistance, once the emergency is over, to continuance of the
revenue collecting system in the high gear required not only to meet
the greater burden of current expenditures but also to reduce apprecia-
bly the already established debt. Whatever the reasons, the results are
clear: the federal government of this country, like the central govern.
ments of many other countries, has financed out of external funds,
not merely additions to assets, but also current expenditures. In any
true sense, the ratio of external financing to capital formation of the
federal government is sharply upward when we compare the first
half of the period since 1900—including World War I—with the second
half, including the depression, World War II, and the cold war that
has characterized the recent years.
22 Morris A. Copelanci, Trends in Government Financing (Princeton for NBER,
1961).
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An Attempt at a Summary
Having reviewed the long-term movement in shares of internal and
external sources of financing for the several sectors of the economy,
we should combine the results in a summary for the economy as a
whole. Several difficulties stand in the way. First, the data for the
sectors do not cover the same periods, and some do not extend through
1950—1955 (or 1956). Second, we must decide on the form of the com-
parison of sources or uses, and not all the latter are available for the
specific sectors. Finally, for some sectors, such as households, we may
want to limit the concept of uses of funds more than for others, and
the definition of sources may also differ among sectors.
Table 45 represents an effort to overcome these difficulties in order
to secure a countrywide picture. The notes to the table contain a brief
account of the statistical manipulations and short-cuts resorted to.
More important is the fact that some lack of comparability remains—
chiefly between the business sector (agriculture, nonfarm unincorpo-
rated business, and corporate business) where the sum of capital con-
sumption allowances and undistributed profits is taken to represent
internal sources, and households (represented by nonfarm residential
construction) where no such assumption is made. Another source of
discrepancy lies in the fact that gross retention of income in the case
of governments, while analogous to that in the business sector with
respect to accounting procedures, can hardly have the same meaning.
All of these dissimilarities reflect the basic characteristics of the major
segments of the economy, and in any attempt to bring those segments
together some artificial element in the common conceptual structure
imposed on them is inevitable.
In Table 45, gross capital formation is compared with gross re-
tention or internal sources. Neither is adjusted for the effects of changes
in inventory valuation or for the difference between original cost base
and reproduction cost base of capital depreciation allowances. The
main question is: did the ratio of gross retention to total real capital
formation for the economy as a whole show any distinct trend?
We start with the business sector—agriculture, nonfarm unincorpo-
rated business, and all corporations (lines 7—9). For the discrete, rela-
tively normal periods—the first decade of the century, the 1920's, and
the post-World War II decade (columns 1, 3, and 6)—the ratio of in-
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NOTES TO TABLE 45
SOURCE: Where the preceding tables cover the period through 1955 or 1956, there
was no problem in bringing the estimates through that' date. Also, even when the
periods distinguished are different from those shown in the preceding tables (e.g. for
nonfarm unincorporated business), the new totals could be calculated from the sources
cited earlier.
The following additional estimates had to be made:
For nonfarm unincorporated business, we assumed that the movement from 1945—
1949 to 1950—1 955, in gross capital formation, in additions to other assets, and in the
proportion of borrowing to total uses, was the same as for agriculture (in Table 35).
This permitted us to bring the series for this sector through 1955.
For households, the estimates had to be extended back to 1901—1910. Expenditures
on nonfarm housekeeping residential construction are available for that period in
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate, Table B-3,
p. 335. To them we added 33 per cent for the cost of land (see ibid., Table M-1, p. 455,
for the ratios used in 1911 and later years). We assumed that the percentage of external
financing was 35 at most (it was less than 50 in 1911—1 920), in view of the much lower
ratio of debt to value in owner-occupied housing in the earlier of the two decades.
For the federal government we assumed that during 1946—1955 there was practically
no retention. The small positive total for 1946—1949 ($9.9 billion) appeared to be offset
by the cumulation of the deficits that followed.
The absolute values in columns 7 to 11 are arithmetic means of the entries in
columns 1 to 6. Those in columns 7, 8, and 10 are unweighted; for columns 9 and 11,
the entries in column 5 are given half weight. The ratios are derived directly from the
absolute values, and are not arithtnetic means of the ratios in columns 1 to 6.
respectively, showing a mild rise. For the three long periods, including
major wars and depressions (columns 7 to 9), the ratio was 0.87, 0.91,
and 1.03, respectively, showing a distinct rise. Finally, for the two long
periods (columns 10 and 11), the ratio was 0.86 and 1.03, respec-
tively, again a marked upward movement.
Then we add nonfarm residential construction to form the total
private sector (lines 12 to 14). Adding it either cancels or reduces the
rise in the ratio of internal funds to capital formation, for the simple
reason that the ratio of internal funds to capital formation for house-
holds declined over time. For the three relatively short normal periods,
the ratio was 0.78, 0.69, and 0.75, respectively—no evidence of either
an upward or downward trend. For the three long periods, the ratio
was 0.81, 0.74, and 0.85, respectively, a mild rise. Finally, for the two
long periods, the ratio was 0.75 and 0.85, respectively, a distinct rise.
We next include state and local governments, and because that sub-
sector is marked by a rather high and rising ratio of internal financ-
ing to gross capital formation, the new totals (lines 17 to 19) again
suggest an upward movement in the ratio, especially for the longer
periods. But without dwelling too long on this hybrid combination
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of the private sector with state and local governments, we pass to the
comprehensive countrywide total, which includes also the federal
government. Here there is a definite indication of constancy or slight
downdrift in the ratio of internal funds to total gross real capital
formation (line 24). The ratio moved from 0.78 in the first decade to
0.76 in the 1920's, then to 0.77 in 1946—1955. When we use longer pe-
riods, including wars and major depressions, the decline becomes more
perceptible: the ratio rose slightly from 0.67 in the first two decades of
the century, to 0.71 in the next two decades, and then dropped to
0.61 in the last decade and a half. For the two long subperiods of the
full period, the ratio was 0.72 and 0.61, respectively. Thus, for the
economy as a whole, the ratio of internal funds to gross real capital
formation was either constant or declined, which means that the ratio
of borrowing to gross real capital formation was either constant or in.
creased.
Before we consider the significance of these findings, it may be well
to compare internal funds or gross retention with total uses of funds
rather than with gross real capital formation alone (Table 46). In the
case of households we assume that new nonfarm residential construc-
tion represents total uses of funds. To treat it otherwise would ne-
cessitate consideration of the accumulation of cash and other financial
assets by households, which would in turn call for distinguishing be-
tween households as investors in dwellings and households as the
largest body of ultimate savers and spenders in the economy.
The results in Table 46 are not much different from those in Table
45, whatever differences there are being due to the greater weight of
the business sector here, with its higher ratio of changes in financial
assets to real capital formation. In the business sector proper, the ratio
of internal funds to total uses (line 6) rose slightly, from 0.59 in each
of the first three decades in the century to 0.64 in the post-World War II
decade. The longer period averages in columns 7 to 9 and 10 to 11
confirm that upward trend. The inclusion of nonfarm residential con-
struction eliminates or reduces the upward trend in the ratio of in-
ternal funds to total uses, as it reduces the ratio in Table 45. But while
the movement in the ratio for the total private sector shows a decline
if discrete periods are used—the ratio moving from 0.61 in column I,
to 0.53 in column 3, to 0.57 in column 6—we observe a rise in the ratio
when wars and depressions are included—from 0.59 in the first two
decades (column 7) to 0.62 in the last one and a half decades (column 9),
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NoTEs TO TABLE 46
SOUaCE For nonfarm unincorporated business, we had to return to the original data
in Goldsmith's A Study of Saving, because of differences between the periods in Table 36
and in the present table.
Because the periods in Tables 39, 43, and 44 for corporations, state and local govern-
ments, and the federal government, differ from those here, we computed the ratios of
gross real capital formation to total uses for the periods in the earlier tables, and ad-
justed them roughly to correspond with the periods in the present table. Whereas for
corporations they were 0.652 for 1901—1912, 0.649 for 191 3—1 922, and 0.593 for 1923—
1929 (Table 39), we assumed 0.65 for 1900—1909, 0.65 for 1910—1919, and 0.60 for
1920—1929. For state and local governments, the three early periods in Table 43
yielded ratios of 0.72, 0.59, and 0.75; our estimates for the first three decades were
0.7, 0.6, and 0.73. For the federal government the ratios for the three early periods
were 0.52, 0.16, and 0.45, respectively (Table 44, excluding military); we assumed
those for the first three decades to be 0.52, 0.20, and 0.45, respectively. For 1946—1 955
we assumed that the ratio of gross real capital formation to total uses was 0.45—the
ratio that characterized the more "normal" span of 1921—1930.
With these ratios at hand, we could derive the estimated volumes of total uses from
the volumes of gross capital formation in Table 45.
The absolute values and ratios in columns 7 to 11 were calculated in the manner
described for Table 45.
The most interesting result is for the economy as a whole, i.e., for the
private and public sectors combined (line 17). Here the discrete pe-
riods which skip the major wars and depressions show a slight decline;
the ratio is 0.60 in column 1, 0.58 in column 3, and 0.56 in column 6.
For the longer periods including wars and the depression of the 1980's,
the ratio shows a somewhat more marked decline—from 0.47 in col-
umn 7 to 0.41 in column 9. And it moves from 0.53 in column 10 to
0.42 in column 11. It can thus be said, in general, that in the business
sector we have an indication of an upward movement of the ratio of
internal funds to either gross capital formation or to total uses; that
in the private sector we have, on the whole, a slight decline on the basis
of normal periods, and a rise if all periods are considered; and that
in the economy as a whole we have a decline.
In the household sector and governments, especially the federal, the
ratio of internal funds to either real capital formation or to total
uses (narrowly defined) has declined significantly. It should be noted
that in both Tables 45 and 46, government capital formation and
total uses exclude durable military goods. Households had recourse to
borrowing that constituted an increasing proportion of the value of
the new dwellings they were buying or constructing. Governments,
representing society as a whole, were borrowing increasingly for pur-
poses that, at least in Tables 45 and 46, appear neither as gross capital
formation nor as additions to financial assets (of the governments).
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Within the business sector, however, the trend in the ratio of internal
funds to uses was in the opposite direction. Obviously, the trend in
any total depends upon the comprehensiveness of the total, the dif-
ferences in the trends of its components, and the weights of the latter.
Two final observations should be made. First, we repeat the warn-
ing expressed in the first section of this chapter to the effect that
aggregates of the type we had to use may conceal considerable
financing external to each business unit, and hence exaggerate the
relative share of internal funds in capital formation or in total uses.
This is particularly true of large aggregates like all corporations; and
it is not safe to conclude from the rise in the ratio of internal funds to
uses, in Table 45 or Table 46, for this group or for the whole business
sector that the dependence upon borrowing has decreased. As suggested
earlier, increasing diversity in the use by corporations of their capital
consumption allowances or of their net profits, may have meant greater
concealment within aggregated totals of demands for external funds.
On the other hand, the higher proportion of large corporations may
have meant reduction in diversity of experience and a trend toward
increased importance of internal funds far greater than is suggested
by the ratios computed above. In short, the measures reflect only part
of the process, and whatever trends they reveal are those at only one
level of the process.
Second, there are obvious interrelations between the trends ob-
served in the three sectors—business, household, and government. In-
deed, at the risk of exaggerating, one can say that the upward trend
in the ratio of internal funds to either capital formation or total uses
in the business sector was associated with the downward trend of the
ratios in the government and household sectors. It was government
expenditures during the war and after, and the factors that determined
them, that allowed (indeed, during the war years, actually forced)
business units to follow a gross retention policy that yielded a very
high ratio of internal funds to total uses. It was the sustention of
consumer demand by the willingness of consumers to finance their
purchases by borrowing that set the conditions for prosperity and
favorable conditions in the business sector, permitting business units
to earn both their capital consumption allowances and substantial
retained profits, and to maintain a high ratio of internal funds to total
uses, even when total uses were rising rapidly. These interrelations
among the sectors are evidence of a mechanism that makes for stability
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in the countrywide ratio. This stability is not mechanically or in-
evitably assured; but the countrywide ratio of internal funds (and
hence, of borrowing) to total real capital formation or to total uses
(properly defined) is most likely to show a much less conspicuous trend
than would the ratios for the subsectors of the economy.
271